## **Certified Trustworthiness**

in the era of

Large Language Models

Linyi Li

**Assistant Professor** 





# Overview



## $\checkmark$

Rethink Certified Trustworthiness for LLMs





# Overview



### **Rethink Certified Trustworthiness for LLMs**





## Neural Image Classifiers are Not Robust



#### Robustness issues are prevalent and dangerous

Ian J. Goodfellow, Jonathon Shlens, Christian Szegedy. Explaining and Harnessing Adversarial Examples. ICLR 2015

# Neat and "Toy" Problem - $\ell_p$ Robustness

Training the classifier  $f: \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{Y}$  to

maximize 
$$\Pr_{(x,y_{true})\sim\mathcal{P}_{test}} [\forall x'. \|x'-x\|_p \leq \epsilon \rightarrow f(x') = y_{true}]$$


- $\|\cdot\|_p$  norm: predefined, common choices are  $\|\cdot\|_{\infty}$ ,  $\|\cdot\|_2$
- $\epsilon$ : small perturbation budget
- A "necessary" condition for worst-case robustness
- Spurs remarkable research progress & powerful methods



 $\bar{p}_{\bar{A}}$ 

 $\overline{p_B}$ 

## **Revisiting** Certified Robustness Approaches



e.g. [Wong and Kolter, 2018]

#### Relaxation Regularization

- Convex relaxations
- Branch-and-bound
- Lipschitz-regularization

•

. . .

### Robust Neural Net Architectures

*e.g.* [*Zhang et al*, 2021]

 $= \|\boldsymbol{x} - \boldsymbol{w}\|_{\infty} + b$ 

- Orthogonal layers
- Gradient-norm preserving activations
- $\ell_{\infty}$ -neurons

. . .

**Robust Inferences** 

*e.g.* [*Cohen et al*, 2019]


- Randomized smoothing
- Diffusion purifications

```
• ...
```



# **Relaxation Regularization**

- Input region:  $\{x' : \|x' x\|_p \le \epsilon\}$
- Propagate and relax



[Wong and Kolter, ICML 2018]

Train to optimize worst case in convex bound
 Or optimize Lipschitz (i.e., sensitivity) bound
 Or tighten convex bound verification at test time




Winner of International Verification of Neural Networks Competitions (VNN-COMP 2021 - 2024)



# **Relaxation Regularization**


- Input region:  $\{x' : \|x' x\|_p \le \epsilon\}$
- Propagate and relax
- Train to optimize worst case in convex bound
  Or optimize Lipschitz (i.e., sensitivity) bound
  Or tighten convex bound verification at test time
- Strongly constrained by compute
- Favorable for <1M models</p>





## **Robust Neural Net Architectures**

- Smoothness implies  $\ell_p$  robustness against test-time perturbations
  - Smoothness: small Lipschitz constant here




*Figure from* [*Li, Xu, Taylor, Studer, and Goldstein, NIPS 2018*]




## **Robust Neural Net Architectures**

Achieving small Lipschitz constant:

• Orthogonal weight matrix:  $W^T W = I$ 



e.g. [Huang et al, CVPR 2020]




#### Blue denotes to learnable weights



## Robust Inferences

Randomized Smoothing:

Aggregate votes from Gaussian-noised inputs




[Cohen, Rosenfeld, and Kolter, ICML 2019]



## Robust Inferences

Distribution center shift  $(x \rightarrow x')$  cannot change probability much

- Rank doesn't change  $\rightarrow$  prediction doesn't change
- Compute robustness guarantees based on probability gap




Prediction for noised inputs:

- Past: Train classifiers on noised inputs
- Recent: Denoise with diffusion models then predict



## Comparison





## Certified $\ell_p$ Robustness: Strong and Generalizable

### • Strong:

- Almost solved on MNIST (>93% certified accuracy under  $\ell_{\infty}$  0.3 perturb.)
- Good on CIFAR-10 (>60% certified accuracy under  $\ell_{\infty}$  2/255 perturb.)
- Non-trivial on ImageNet (>35% certified accuracy under  $\ell_2$  2.0 perturb.)

### • Generalizable:

- Same methodology generalizable for other trustworthiness threats
- Examples: Robustness against
  - Semantic transformations
  - Patch attacks
  - Synonym changes
  - Adversarial prompts

- Training data poisoning
- Distribution shifts
- Observation perturbations in RL



# More on Certified Robustness

### sokcertifiedrobustness.github.io



TAXONOMY



### SUMMARY

- Characteristics
- Strengths
- Limitations

. . .

- Connections
- Generalization

## DISCUSSION BENCHMARK

- Current Research
- Theoretical Barriers
- Main Challenges
- Future Directions

. . .

#### VeriGauge Open-source platform for 20+ approaches


[Li, Xie, and Li, IEEE Security & Privacy 2023]



# Overview



### Rethink Certified Trustworthiness for LLMs





## LLM Trustworthiness is Important

Not only for general social good in existing LLM applications

But also (maybe more importantly) for human controllability when AGI or even ASI comes

Trustworthiness is attracting broader interests in the LLM era



# What makes LLM trustworthiness challenging?

- Large model size
- Discrete & variable-length input & output
- More stealthy defects
- Various perturbation types
- Diverse undesirable behaviors
- Questions on research value

robustness in NLP is a tricky topic and i don't think certified robustness is important at all for language. paper also fails to explain why it's important. if certified robustness is so important than chatGPT would already be using it.

•

More discussion:

Rando, Javier, Jie Zhang, Nicholas Carlini, and Florian Tramèr. "Adversarial ML Problems Are Getting Harder to Solve and to Evaluate." arXiv:2502.02260.



## What makes LLM trustworthiness challenging?

**Ideological Front** 

- Questions on research value
- Diverse undesirable behaviors

Technical Front

- Large model size
- Discrete & variable-length input & output
- More stealthy defects

. . .

• Various perturbation types

. . .



## Important Ideological Research Questions

Diverse undesirable behaviors call for:

Questions on research value call for:

#### Define & agree on a "simplified" problem/notion to solve

• Similar to  $\ell_p$  robustness

#### **Requirements:**

- Can motivate generalizable methods
- Have clear physical meaning
- Non-trivial
- Focus on model rather than system solutions

# Demonstrate practical safety & security challenges

• Similar to physical attacks on image models

#### ✓ Rich research on:

Unaligned models practically unsafe/unsecure

#### **b** Need more research on:

'Simple trustworthiness problem' that brings broadly practically safe/secure models 20


## Hunting for Technical Solutions from Human

- We achieve (probably better) trustworthiness
- Compared to certified robustness approaches, our humans are:

Model	More Constrained	•	We don't optimize "fully-connected" large matrices More structured; hyperactivity is usually abnormal
Training	Simple		We don't optimize some complex bounds We recite, reason, and drive by goals
Inference	Think & Aggregation	٠	When not sure, we pause to read & think more




## Recall





## **Future: Robust Architectures and Inferences**





# Overview





Rethink Certified Trustworthiness for LLMs





## Define " $\ell_p$ -Robustness" in Language Domain

- Proposed notion:
  - Detailed, explicit, and robust base prompts
  - Arbitrarily add or remove or modify  $\leq \epsilon\%$  tokens
  - Model's response attitude does not change
- \* Ongoing and necessary: test notion generalizability
  - Positive correlation with trustworthiness in other aspects
  - Broader improves generalization and learning efficiency



## Smooth Language Models

#### Key Methodology: Combine Robust Architectures and Robust Inferences

>Multi-token thinking as a form of nature aggregation

 $\rightarrow$  Robustify the prediction

➤Certified robustness requires:

Bounding worse-case temporal dependence

 $\rightarrow$  Attention capping, dis-entangling, and reweighting

Bounding sensitivity

 $\rightarrow$  1-Lipschitz self-attention, L2 self-attention

Independent ensembles

 $\rightarrow$  More independent MoEs

## References

. . .



- Li, Linyi, Tao Xie, and Bo Li. Sok: Certified robustness for deep neural networks." IEEE S&P 2023.
- Li, Linyi, Maurice Weber, Xiaojun Xu, Luka Rimanic, Bhavya Kailkhura, Tao Xie, Ce Zhang, and Bo Li. "TSS: Transformation-specific smoothing for robustness certification." ACM CCS 2021.
- Xu, Xiaojun, Linyi Li, Yu Cheng, Subhabrata Mukherjee, Ahmed Hassan Awadallah, and Bo Li. "Certifiably robust transformers with 1-lipschitz self-attention." <u>https://openreview.net/forum?id=hzG72qB0XQ</u>
- Kumar, Aounon, Chirag Agarwal, Suraj Srinivas, Aaron Jiaxun Li, Soheil Feizi, and Himabindu Lakkaraju. "Certifying Ilm safety against adversarial prompting." COLM 2024.
- Huang, Zijian, Wenda Chu, Linyi Li, Chejian Xu, and Bo Li. "COMMIT: Certifying Robustness of Multi-Sensor Fusion Systems against Semantic Attacks." AAAI 2025. (Friday 12:30 - 2:30 PM, Poster #80)

Stay tuned to our research @ <u>sfu-</u> <u>tai.github.io</u> **Thanks! Any questions are welcome**